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CASES NOTED
BANKRUPTCY
RECLAMATION -

UNPAID SELLER'S PRIORITY AGAINST LIEN CREDITOR -

In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968).- Appellant
delivered shoes on credit to Golde. Subsequently, the appellee-creditors
levied attachment liens against Golde's entire inventory. Appellant made a
timely demand for the return of its shoes, and Golde filed a Chapter XI
insolvency petition under the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 721 (1964).
The referee found Golde insolvent, appellant filed a reclamation petition,
and the referee held him to be a secured creditor with rights superior to
those of the appellees. The district court overturned the referee's findings,
holding that the appellant had only an unperfected security interest. Reversing, the court of appeals held that the Uniform Commercial Code did
not define the relative rights of the parties; rather, Kentucky common law
was determinative and it upheld the superiority of the appellant's claim.
By so holding, the court affirmed that in the absence of statutory guidance, the UCC is to be supplemented by the common law of each jurisdiction
in which it is enacted.
CIVIL RIGHTS
FAIR HOUSING ACT -

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC HOUSING -

Gautreux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. IIl. 1969).
This action was instituted by Chicago Negro tenants and applicants for
public housing, alleging that, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (Supp. III, 1969) and the 14th amendment, the
Chicago Housing Authority had adopted tenant assignment and project location procedures for the purpose of maintaining racial segregation. Granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the court held that the
Authority's administration of a quota system limiting the number of Negro
occupants in predominantly white neighborhood projects was discriminatory
as a matter of law. Further, the court noted that the Authority must have
realized that because 90 percent of the occupancy waiting list was comprised
of Negroes, its policy of obtaining the approval of ward aldermen before
selecting project sites would ultimately result in a "racial veto" of those sites
recommended for predominantly white wards. The court held this 90 percent to be indicative of a deliberate policy to separate blacks from whites in
violation of equal protection of the laws.
It is apparent that housing policies which tend to maintain de facto
segregation will not be tolerated. While the court expressly imposed no
affirmative duty upon the Chicago Housing Authority to develop programs
designed to end de facto segregation, in disposing of similar discriminatory
policies other courts have stated that the mere termination of those policies
is not enough.
MODIFICATION OF VOTING PROCEDURES ING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 Allen v.

REGULATION UNDER THE VOT-

State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S.
544 (1969).Four appellants brought individual suits in the district
courts of Virginia and Mississippi alleging that various changes in state
election procedures were unenforceable since the procedures had not been
validated by the method required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
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U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. III, 1968). The new procedures included, inter alia,
an amendment that prohibited one who had voted in a primary election from
running as an independant candidate and a requirement that certain candidates previously elected by their district must now run at large. Although
the respective lower courts concluded that these changes were not covered by
the act, the Supreme Court disagreed and ordered the district courts to enjoin the enforcement of any election modifications.
In holding that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 regulates state laws
which govern both an individual's right to vote and the effect of that vote,
the Supreme Court has reiterated its intention to interpret the act so as to
make the guarantee of the 15th amendment a reality for all citizens.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DUE PROCESS OF LAW REGULATION OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT'S APPEARANCE Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969).-

Plaintiff, an 11th grade high school student, was expelled from school for
violating a regulation prohibiting male students from wearing their hair
below a specific length. After his appeal to the state school superintendant was rejected, plaintiff brought this action in the federal court alleging that
the regulation was a violation of due process of law as guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution. The court agreed with the plaintiff's contention,
ordered his reinstatement, and granted an injunction against the continued
enforcement of the regulation. The court felt that neither the plaintiff's age
nor his enrollment in a public school warranted an invasion of his right to
present himself to the world in any reasonable manner.
This case is a gratifying example of judicial willingness to recognize that
in education there are matters more important than conformity. It reiterates the premise of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 499 (1965), that the
protected rights of an individual go beyond those expressly granted by the
Constitution.
DICTUM AD NAUSEAM Miller v. Reddin, 293 F. Supp.
216 (C.D. Calif. 1968).- Plaintiff, indicted under California and federal
obscenity statutes for publication, possession, and distribution of allegedly
obscene written material, sought declaratory relief, damages, and an injunction against his criminal prosecution. His claim was based on the protection
of "free speech" found in the first amendment. However, following a
careful, cover to cover scrutiny of the offensive material, District Judge
Hauk, applying the United States Supreme Court test, found the material to
be outside the protective purview of the first amendment. The cause was,
therefore, dismissed and plaintiff's criminal prosecution was allowed to progress.
The case is notable, not for its application of the Roth-Michkin-Ginzburg standard of obscenity, but for the superfluous detail in which Judge
Hauk graphically recapitulates for one-third of his opinion parts of plaintiff's books. Judging from the repetition and eye for detail evidenced in the
court's opinion, plaintiff's books must be the most unprotected speech ever
written, or Judge Hauk must be the hardest working federal district judge
in the country.
OBSCENITY -

Avom SELF-INCRIMINATION - USE BY VOLUNTARY PARTICISimkins v. Simkins, 219 So. 2d 724 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969).Appellant, the initiator of divorce proceedings, refused to comply with a
RIGHT TO
PANTS -
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court order to answer questions concerning alleged adulterous activities.
When the trial court dismissed appellant's action for divorce, he appealed
alleging that by conditioning his right to prosecute upon a waiver of his
fifth amendment right to avoid self-incrimination, the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure made the exercise of the latter right costly. The Florida Court of
Appeals held that the action by the trial court violated appellant's right to
avoid self-incrimination.
The majority, citing Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), and Garrity
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), held that the exercise of the right to
avoid self-incrimination cannot be penalized by the state in any way. The
dissent contended that the no penalty rule enunciated in Spevack and
Garrity applied only to persons involuntarily before the court, and that such
a rule should not be used to immunize the initiator of a suit from the untoward effects of discovery proceedings. This is the first case to extend the
no penalty rule to voluntary participants, and as the dissent observed, it is
doubtful whether a close reading of either Garrity or Spevack would support
such an interpretation.
SENTENCING SELF INCRIMINATION ---(D.C. Cir. 1969).- A trial judge,

Scott v. United States, ____ F.2d.
after noting the failure of the convicted defendant to admit his guilt, sentenced an armed bank robber to from
5 to 15 years. Remanding for resentencing, the court of appeals found that
the trial judge's expressed consideration of the lack of confession made the
excercise of the defendant's fifth amendment rights costly since it could be
shown that the defendant received harsher punishment than the court would
have decreed had a post-conviction confession been made.
In so holding, the court gives approbation to the theory expressed in
Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966), that equates a
confession of guilt at allocution with a waiver of the self-incrimination
privilege, and thereby imports the same strict standard of voluntariness as
required for a plea of guilty. Although the case does not present the question, the court of appeals suggests that the contemporary practice of plea
bargaining is not conducive to the voluntary waiver of a defendant's fifth
amendment rights.
EVIDENCE
CRIMINAL LAW -

IDENTIFICATION BY WITNESS -

Russell v. United States,
408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969).- Appellant sought relief from a conviction for housebreaking and petit larcency, contending that the conviction
was violative of due process requirements. Specifically, he maintained that
identification by a witness was inadmissible evidence because recent Supreme Court decisions made the presence of counsel mandatory at all pretrial
confrontations and because all one-man lineups are unconstitutional. The
court recognized that due process usually requires the presence of counsel at
confrontations between witnesses and the accused, but held that when such
confrontations occur only moments after the crime, the reliability of resultant indentifications outweighs the potential injustice. The court also held
that because there are no viable alternatives to one-man lineups in the on
scene confrontation situation, such lineups are not unconstitutional per se.
The decision represents an attempt to flesh out the skeletal doctrine
espoused in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), wherein the
Supreme Court held that pretrial confrontations must be carefully scrutinized
to determine whether the presence of counsel is required in order to pre-
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serve a defendant's basic fifth and sixth amendment rights. The court's
refusal to extend Wade to the prearraignment stages of confrontation reflects judicial deference to the recent congressional approval of eyewitness
identification prior to trial contained in the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3502 (Supp. 1969).
INFORMING ACCUSED OF His RIGHTS - Orozco v. Texas,
393 U.S. 822 (1969).- Petitioner appealed from a murder conviction,
contending that certain evidence admitted at trial was obtained in violation
of the fifth amendment. Four police officers had followed petitioner to his
boarding house shortly after the crime and, after gaining entry to his bedroom, awakened petitioner and asked him questions in response to which
he gave incriminating answers. Petitioner argued that he should have been
warned of his rights under the fifth amendment in accordance with Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The state responded that Miranda was
inapplicable because the interrogation occurred in surroundings familiar to
petitioner. The Court, in reversing the conviction, held that the warning
was required whenever an individual's freedom of action is removed in any
way.
This holding is a further indication that the Court's interpretation of
fifth amendment requirements as announced in Miranda is broad in scope.
Individuals in custody, even in apparently friendly surroundings, must be
apprised of their constitutional rights prior to being questioned.
CRIMINAL LAW -

ADMISSABILITY State v. Holt, 17 Ohio St. 2d 81,
246 N.E.2d 365 (1969).- Holt was arrested in connection with the
forceable rape of a 7-year-old girl. Pubic hair was taken from Holt's
clothing and from the person of the girl. This was examined by neutron
activation analysis and expert testimony was admitted pertaining to the
findings. The analyst stated that the samples were similar and likely to be
from the same source. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the conviction
on the ground that it was prejudicial error to admit such testimony. The
court stated that likely imports less than reasonable certainty or probability
as required by law for such evidence to be admitted.
By refusing to admit this evidence the court has departed from the
generally accepted standard that any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert should be received. The accuracy of the test
is determinative of weight and not the admissibility of the evidence.

SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS -

FEDERAL CIvIL PROCEDURE

HABEAS

CORPUS -

DISCOVERY -

Harris v. Nelson, 393 U.S.

814

(1969).- Pursuant to a habeas corpus evidentiary hearing, petitioner, a
district court judge, had authorized a prisoner's issuance of interrogatories
to the warden of the penitentiary in which the prisoner was confined. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the authorization was invalid because neither the discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure nor 28 U.S.C. § 2246 (1964), the sole statutory
provision delineating the use of discovery in habeas corpus proceedings,
authorized the issuance of the interrogatories. Although the Supreme
Court concurred with the Ninth Circuit's statutory interpretations, it reversed, holding that where specific allegations before the court indicate
that a petitioner may be able to demonstrate the illegality of his confine-
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ment, the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964), empowers federal
courts to fabricate the necessary facilities and procedures to insure that an
adequate inquiry will precede the habeas corpus evidentiary hearing.
The decision resolves the diversity of views as to the applicability of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to habeas corpus proceedings expressed by the lower federal courts and appears to invite those lower courts
to create a system of discovery for such proceedings. The Court indicated,
however, that it considered a case by case rule formulation by the lower
courts to be inadequate and that, pursuant to its rule-making power, 28
U.S.C.A. § 2072 (Supp. 1969), it intends to launch proceedings to formulate a comprehensive set of rules for the conduct of habeas corpus litigation rather than merely the discovery aspects thereof. No indication was
given as to when the rule-making proceedings would be convened.
UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS REVIEW
OF DECISIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE Varian Associates v.
United States ---- F.2d __ -- (C.C.P.A. 1969).- Illinois State Univer-

sity, pursuant to item 851.60, of the tariff schedules established by the
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials Importation Act of 1966,
19 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. III, 1968), applied to the Secretary of Commerce
for duty-free entry of a Hitachi Perkin-Elmer nuclear magnetic resonance
spectrometer which the university proposed to purchase from the Japanese
manufacturer. Varian Associates filed comments before the Secretary opposing the application, asserting that it manufactured apparatus equivalent
in scientific value to the proposed import. The Secretary, basing his decision upon advisory memoranda from the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, and the National Bureau of Standards, approved the application, finding that no instrument equivalent in scientific value to the foreign model is being manufactured in the United States.
On appeal, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
affirmed the Secretary's decision, holding that the Secretary's findings were
supported by substantial evidence. This decision represents the first instance in which the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has asserted
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1544 (1964) to review a decision of the
Secretary of Commerce under the 1966 Act.
NAVIGABLE WATERS

United States v. LouOWNERSHIP BY STATES isiana, 393 U.S. 811 (1969).- In an attempt to resolve a coastal boundary dispute continuing since 1950 between the Federal Government and
Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that "coastline" and "inland waters"
as used in the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 shall be given definition by
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Reversing
its position taken in an earlier decision involving the State of Texas, not to
use international law and treaties to decide domestic disputes, the Court
stressed the desirability of a single coastline both for administration of the
Submerged Lands Act and for international relations.
The decision, however, will not put to rest this seemingly endless series
of disputes, for the coastline by Convention definition will be ambulatory.
In view of the frequently changing nature of the Gulf coastline, it would
seem that there may continue to be controversies over boundary definition,
especially in the area of established offshore oil leases.
LANDS UNDERWATER -
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COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION -

ACCRUAL OF RIGHT OF Ac-

TION -

Heyer v. Flaig, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).- In a suit for malpractice against an attorney for allegedly failing to carry out the testamentary
wishes of his dient, the defendant asserted that the action was barred by a
2-year statute of limitations. Although the testatrix's will was drafted
more than 2 years before this action, the plaintiffs, daughters of the testatrix, contended that the statute of limitations did not bar their action because the statutory period was measured from the date of the death of the
testatrix, rather than from the date of the attorney's negligent act.
In affirming the plaintiffs' position, the California Supreme Court distinguished as "inappropriate" cases holding that the statute of limitations
in legal malpractice suits begins at the commission of the negligent act.
Since the plaintiffs could not have brought suit before the death of the testatrix, a literal application of the statute of limitations would have reduced
the effectiveness of the court's decisions that have recognized an attorney's
duty of care toward intended beneficiaries.
REAL PROPERTY

Kriegler v. Eichler
Homes, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Ct. App. 1969).- Plaintiff Kriegler
bought a 5-year-old house built by Eichler Homes, a mass builder. Two
years later the house's heating system failed as a result of tubing corrosion,
causing a $5000 loss. The homeowner sued the builder on a theory of
strict tort liability, a doctrine accepted in the field of personal property but
rarely applied in real property. The trial court found the heating system
defective as installed and held the builder strictly liable. Affirming this
first impression case, the California court of appeals held that there was no
meaningful distinction between Eichler's mass production and sale of
homes and the mass manufacture of personalty such as automobiles, long
subject to strict liability. Because a buyer relies on the skill of a mass
builder to produce a house reasonably free from defects, the court held that
the builder should be strictly liable for construction flaws which were unknown to the buyer.
With this case, California joins the growing minority of forward-looking jurisdictions which have jettisoned the outdated notion of caveat emptor in the field of real estate. In addition, by relying on strict tort, rather
than implied warranty, the court managed to avoid any problems of privity.
CONTRACTS OF SALE -

STRICT TORT LIAiLITY -

SECURrrIES
MISSTATEMENT AMD OMISSIONS Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,367 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
7, 1969).- Plaintiffs, minority shareholders of the former General Outdoor
Advertising Company (General), brought suit against Gamble-Skogmo
Company (Skogmo) alleging violations of sections 10(b) and 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78n(a) (1964),
and rules 10b-5 and 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.14a-9 (1969).
The court held that Skogmo's proxy statement omitted the material facts
that (1) the liquidating value of General's plants prior to the merger far
exceeded the book value, and that (2) Skogmo intended to sell these assets immediately after the merger, thereby depriving General's stockholders
of an undiluted interest in capital gains realized on the sale.

PROXY STATEMENT
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In so holding, the court defined the concept of materality under rule
14a-9 as a fact or omission in a proxy statement which a reasonable man
would consider important in determining his choice in the particular transaction. In basing its decision on rule 14a-9 rather than on rule 10b-5,
the court was able to effectuate the policy of informed stockholder enfranchisement unhampered by the more traditional deceit concepts of rule 10b-5
relied upon by some courts.
REGISTRATION -

MAILING CONFIRMATION SLIPS United States v.
Wolfson, 405 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1968).The defendant appealed
from a criminal conviction arising out of a violation of section 5(a)(1) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1964). Section 5 makes
it unlawful for any person to use the mails or interstate commerce to sell
unregistered securities. In affirming the conviction, the court rejected the
contention that the mailing of confirmation slips from the broker to the
defendant-seller was too tangential a use of the mails to satisfy the jurisdictional means requirement of section 5(a)(1). While recognizing that
prior cases had held that the mailing of confirmation slips from a broker to
a buyer was within the jurisdictional means requirement, the court reasoned
that confirmation to a seller is as essential to a valid sale as confirmation is
to a buyer.
In refusing to strictly construe the jurisdictional means requirement of
section 5 in a criminal action, the court espoused the liberal interpretation
that the jurisdictional means requirement of that section is met when the
use of the mails is merely facilitative of a sale, or is reasonably foreseeable
that it will lead to a sale of unregistered securities.
STANDING Electronic Specialty Co. v. International
Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969) .- Plaintiff, the target
corporation of a tender offer, sought an injunction against defendant corporation for alleged misrepresentation and nondisclosure of material facts,
a violation of the 1968 amendments, subsections (d), (e), and (f), to section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d),
(e), (f) (Supp. 1969). In a case of first impression, the court of appeals
reversed the order of the district court granting injunctive relief and dismissed the complaint. More significantly, however, the court, reasoning
by analogy from section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964), found that pursuant to the newly enacted provisions of section 14 both the target corporation and nontendering stockholders
have standing to maintain separate actions.
The decision follows the increasing trend in the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit to expand the scope of civil remedies and thereby provide
for speedy and forceful remedial action against alleged violations of securities law.
TENDER OFFERS -

TORTS
SPACE LEASE DISTINGUISHED Wall v. Airport Parking
Co., .... Ill. 2d - -, 244 N.E.2d 190 (1969).- The insurer of an automobile stolen from a self-parking lot at O'Hare Airport received judgment
based on the lot operator's negligence. In ascertaining whether the evidence supported this finding, the Illinois Supreme Court had to determine
whether a bailment or merely a lease of space was created by parking in
BAILMENT -
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such a lot. Because the motorist retained his keys and did not surrender
custody of the automobile to a lot attendant, the court found a bailment
was not established and observed that even though the mechanized parking
lot offers a high degree of security, its primary purpose is to provide space.
Accordingly, the court held that the insurer had to prove specific negligent
acts and that the record, while establishing the prima fade negligence of
a bailee, did not sustain this greater burden of proof.
While the automated parking lot presents a unique twist, in this case of
first impression the court observed the traditional distinction between bailment and space lease, the presence or absence of the owner's surrender of
control. In view of the proliferation of automated parking facilities, the
court's adoption of the stringent burden of proof traditionally associated
with space lease arrangements effectively forces the Illinois motorist to assume the costs of insuring against all auto thefts. It would seem that the
court ought to have departed from the traditional distinction because of the
modern motorist's increasingly frequent inability to choose between bailment and space lease and because, of the two concerned parties, the lot
owner is the one who is best able to economically prevent auto theft.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ASSIGNMENT

OF SEcuRITY AGREEMENT

-

WARRANTIES -

Public Fi-

nance Corp. v. Furnitureland, 17 Ohio App. 2d 213, 245 N.E.2d 740
(1969).- Buyers purchased merchandise and signed a security agreement
which was then assigned by the defendant seller "without recourse" to
plaintiff, Public Finance Corporation. Following the buyer's return of the
defective merchandise and subsequent refusal to accept the seller's tender
of replacement, plaintiff brought suit on the security agreement, claiming
breach of warranty. Defendant argued that the assignment was governed
by article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and that under section 3-417 of the UCC, when a transfer is "without recourse," the transferor warrants only that he has no knowledge of any defense good against
him at the time of transfer. The court, finding that article 2 of the UCC
was sufficiently analogous to govern the transaction because transfer of the
security agreement constituted a "sale" between merchants, held that defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability under section
2-314 of the UCC.
The decision follows the trend to reason by analogy from the UCC and
to apply warranty principles to commercial transactions not expressly covered by the Code. However, the court's failure to explain the significance of the "without recourse" provision in its article 2 context renders
the decision of questionable value for precedent.
WILLS
ADOPTED CHILDREN In re Thompson, 53 N.J. 276,
250 A.2d 393 (1969).- Testator died 1-year after the execution of his
will which directed the bequest of a class gift to his issue. Appellant was
adopted by testator's daughter 7 years after testator's death. In this contest against his natural-born brother, appellant asserted a claim to one-half
of his deceased mother's share of the corpus and the retained income therefrom. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the term "lawful issue" included adopted children, overruling cases in that state equating
"issue" with "heirs of the body" under the preclusion clause of the New
CLASS GIFTS -
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Jersey adoption statute. The decision illustrates the trend evident in several states to protect the inheritance rights of adopted children by presuming their inclusion unless the testator demonstrates a dear intent to limit
the inheritance to those in his direct bloodline. See 20 CASE W.REs.L.
REv. 694 (1969).

